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NASA’s Shared Experiences Program 
New directions for the fourth project management shared experiences program, this one held in Virginia Beach. 
Dr. Edward J. Hoffman 
Core Issues for the Future of the Agency 
NASA’s Deputy Administrator focuses on the Agency’s strategic plan, project management and communication. 
National Space Policy Strategic Management 
Two officials from the Office of Policy and Plans describe the current status of the new strategic plan. 
Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
9 ISO9000andNASA Carl Schneider 
11 New Acquisition Initiatives Kenneth A. Sateriale 
15 Full Cost Initiative Joseph R. Struhar 
17 PM Career Development Owen C. Gadeken 
19 PM Project Database Bernard Dixon and Gene Guerny 
21 NASA Fast Tkack Studies Gregory Stover 
25 Fast Track Projects Ray Piper 
27 Earned Value Concept Wayne F. Abba 
29 Value-Added Metrics Gilbert L. Roth 
Global Work Mary O’Hara-Devereaux 
This author from the Institute for the Future describes six trends and core competencies for workers in the next 
millennium. 
Skills Sessions: Self-Management 
35 Insideout Coaching George Knight 
37 Team-Based Problem Solving Tom Logsdon 
39 Capability Maturity Model George Albright 
41 Program Development David Pugh 
Saturn Corporation Lessons Learned James L. Lewandowski 
The General Motors Vice President for Human Resources is called to build a high performance organization in Tennessee. 
Gen. John R. Dailey 
Alan Ladwig and Gary Steinberg 
. .- 
Project Manager Credibility Hal Mooz 
The founder of the Center for Systems Management stresses a common vocabulary, the project cycle, applications and 
teamwork. 
The Cypress Project Michael Chan 
A construction manager for Caltrans describes the billion-dollar reconstruction of elevated highways in Oakland. 
Construction of the Hong Kong Airport ’hdor Walters 
Bechtel’s project manager shares his experience on the $21 billion project on the eve of a transition in government. 
NASA’s Faster, Better, Cheaper 
Lockheed Martin’s Vice President of Flight Systems and former Associate Deputy Administrator, Chief Scientist and 
Center Director at GSFC questions the slogan. 
Resources Heather Crump 
Source lists on each major conference topic by category for further reading and research. 
Dr. Noel W. Hinners 
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The Project Management Shared Experiences Program 
Virginia Beach, Virginia 
March 25-28, 1997 
New Directions 
Dr. Edward J. Hoffman 
Welcome to “Project Management Now and in the 
New Millennium,” the fourth offering of this pro- 
gram of shared experiences. With each program the 
level of interest seems to expand in terms of both 
participation and interest in delivering sessions. The 
line-up for this program represents the most impres- 
sive array of speakers we have ever had for a Project 
Management Shared Experiences Program. 
In virtually every area of our organization, as well as 
the world, we see the unmistakable signs of massive 
change. The issue is no longer whether to change, or 
even when we will change, but how we will direct 
the change into a bold new century. 
From the beginning, the Project Management Shared 
Experiences Program was set up to be a forum for 
the NASA community to share information, hopes 
and concerns about NASA project management. 
Through this forum, effective networks can be 
formed to help NASA embrace the future. In recent 
years this network has been expanded to include col- 
leagues from industry, universities and international 
partners. This expansion reflects the growing global- 
ization of project management, as well as NASA‘s 
commitment to be a leading player in this area. 
This year’s program emphasized many of the critical 
trends that are transforming a new organizational 
reality. As we begin the year 1997, I am very pleased 
that the NASA Program/Project Management 
Initiative, established in 1987, continues to step up to 
the challenges inherent in this decade. For example, 
NASA can offer to the people in the project manage- 
ment community a world-class, industry-bench- 
marked, professional development process. The 
Project Management Development Process (PMDP) 
is a voluntary process of development, supported at 
each NASA installation, a program that continues to 
grow and receive international recognition. 
This shared experiences program was diverse, rele- 
vant and packed with possibilities. Breakout sessions 
were conducted by experts who, in most cases, are 
leading practitioners in their disciplines. All of these 
sessions reflected key issues of change impacting 
project management. 
Another new direction was the offering of a “skills 
workshop” day. The intent here was to offer several 
four-hour sessions during which a program participant 
could attend two. These sessions offered more direct, 
hands-on skills in a small concentration of time. 
Of course, as in the past, we were fortunate to offer ple- 
nary sessions with people who are resetting the bench- 
marks of project management. I am very impressed 
with the speakers and panelists who were assembled. 
They represent a cross section of the best of NASA, 
industry, government and universities. Furthermore, 
many of our speakers are seminal thinkers and leaders 
in their fields, and expect they challenged our assump- 
tions and stimulated our thinking. 
Dr Edward J .  HofJian 
NASA Headquarters 
Code FT 
Washington, DC 20546 
ed.hofian @ hq.nasa.gov 
(202) 358-2182 
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Critical Core Issues for the Future of the Agency 
General John R. Dailey 
General John R. Dailey, USMC (retired) has been 
Acting Deputy Administrator of NASA since March 
1993 and also serves as Associate Deputy 
Administrator. In his 36 years in the Marine Corps he 
clocked 6,000 hours of flight time, including 450 
fixed wing missions during two tours in Vietnam. 
Prior to his arrival at NASA, he was Assistant 
Commandant of the Corps. 
General Dailey focused on three general areas in his 
hour and a half with delegates to the Project 
Management Shared Experiences Program: NASA’s 
strategic plan, project management and communica- 
tions. 
He began by urging everyone to study and work the 
newly approved NASA Strategic Plan, the Agency’s 
blueprint to year 2020. He spoke directly to NASA’s 
36% cut in budget, from $122 billion to $82 billion 
over five years, and a staffing decrease to approxi- 
mately 18,000 civil servants by October 1999. Why 
change things? “We can’t afford to do it the old 
way,” he noted. Directives are in place, the process is 
being developed, but resistance is Agencywide. His 
job is to push the change process and drive the dead- 
line. The NASA culture is strong, creative and col- 
laborative, he acknowledged. He and others noted 
that Office of Management and Budget proclaims 
NASA as a model of reinvention in government. 
“Project management is the absolute heart of NASA,” 
he said. One major shift is from operations to R&D. 
The recent NPG 7 120.4/5 Directive and forthcoming 
Handbook must become “bibles for our programs,” 
especially with more lead Center and cross-Center 
projects. “Your projects are measurable,” he said, and 
“technical competence is first, last and always.” 
In terms of communication, General Dailey said: 
“Communication is our biggest problem in the 
Agency,” internally and externally. While each gov- 
ernment Agency is forbidden by law to advertise or 
Figure I .  Gen. Dailey speaks to the NASA shared 
experiences program participants 
promote its successes, NASA could learn from 
politicians and public affairs specialists. Technical 
briefs, for example, must be “consumable,” written 
at eighth grade level. 
In summary, General Dailey said: “We decided we 
would design an Agency that worked as a team of 
Centers, each providing its unique capabilities to this 
total, which enables us to maintain our position of 
excellence in doing the hard things nobody else can 
do, providing the technology that enables American 
industry to develop its products and maintain its 
supremacy in the industrialized world.” 
General John Dailey 
NASA Headquarters 
Code AI 
Washington, DC 20546 
(202) 358- I82 I 
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National Space Policy Strategic Management 
Alan Ladwig and Gary Steinberg 
Alan M. Ladwig is Associate Administrator for 
Policy and Plans overseeing strategic plans and poli- 
cies, as well as the History Office. He had served on 
the Administrator’s task force that produced 
Leadership and America’s Future in Space. Gary A. 
Steinberg is Director of Strategic Management in the 
Office of Policy and Plans, coordinating the devel- 
opment of NASA’s Strategic Plan, the Strategic 
Management Systems Handbook and the 
Agencywide metrics system. He chairs the NASA 
Strategic Management Working Group. 
Alan Ladwig opened the discussion of strategic plans 
by noting a September 1996 switch from President 
Ultimate 
Resource Decision 
Provider Makers 
To advance and 
communicate 
scientific 
knowledge and 
understanding of 
Earth, the 
environment of 
space, the Solar 
System, and the 
Universe and use 
the environment of 
space for research 
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and enable the 
development of 
space for human 
enterprise 
To research, 
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aeronautics, space 
Bush’s primary space goal to “strengthen and main- 
tain the national security of the United States” to a 
national space policy that would “enhance knowl- 
edge of the Earth, the solar system and the universe 
through human and robotic exploration.” 
The top policy goal for Aeronautics research and 
technology is to “maintain the superiority of U.S. air- 
craft and engines.” The Clinton Administration mod- 
ified the SEI missions to the Moon and Mars, 
increased the emphasis on joint ventures, especially 
with the Russians, and altered the International 
Space Station to save it after a congressional effort to 
kill it lost by just one vote. 
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Figure 2. Strategic Framework for NASA 
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Figure 3. NASA S Strategic Roadmap to the Future 
The effort now is to align national space policy with 
the Agency strategic plan, with Enterprise and func- 
tionalktaff implementation plans, with Center and 
Center of Excellence plans and eventually with pro- 
gram plans and Program Commitment Agreements 
(PCAs) with individual performance plans. 
He described the “strategic framework for a single 
NASA” (Figure 2) based upon the four customer- 
focused Strategic Enterprises, crosscut or executed 
by functional and staff offices at Headquarters and 
Centers. He also described where the Agency is cur- 
rently headed in terms of missions and goals from 
1997 to 2025 and beyond (Figure 3). 
Gary Steinberg asked: “Where do you fit in the 
NASA Strategic Plan?” stressing the importance of 
linking individual performance plans to PCAs, pro- 
gram or project plans which in turn should align with 
Center and Agency plans. He noted the need to 
“streamline, reduce redundancy and focus on 
Agency priorities.” Thus, instead of redundant 
Center capabilities we have Centers of Excellence. 
Instead of Headquarters program offices we have 
lead Centers. Instead of multiple decision paths we 
have councils and boards on program management 
and capital investment. Instead of fragmented indi- 
vidual functions and approaches, we now have inte- 
grated crosscutting processes. 
Stressing the need to “clarify roles and responsibili- 
ties,” Steinberg explained the role of the new Capital 
Investment Council (CIC) in balancing resources 
among the four Strategic Enterprises for facilities, 
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human resources, technology, information systems, 
environmental management and other designated 
long-term investments. 
Copies of the blue NASA Strategic Plan (dated February 
1996) and the red NASA Strategic Management 
Handbook (dated October 1996) were distributed to par- 
ticipants. 
Alan LQdwig 
NASA Headquarters 
Code Z 
Washington, DC 20546 
aladwig @ hq.nasa.gov 
(202) 358-2096 
Gary Steinberg 
NASA Headquarters 
Code Z 
Washington, DC 20546 
gary. steinberg @ hq.nasa.gov 
(202) 358-4552 
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Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
IS0  9000 and NASA 
Carl Schneider 
The International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) was created in 1946 to help postwar Europe 
achieve harmonized product specifications. In 1987, 
the initial first five series standards were released in 
the U.S. through the American National Standards 
Institute and the American Society for Quality 
Control; in 1994 the standards were released in a sec- 
ond edition. Today, IS0  9000 is a world wide stan- 
dard adopted by more than 100 countries. 
The NASA Administrator has directed the Agency to 
become IS0  9000 certified by a third-party registrar 
by September 1999. While NASA is a leader in sci- 
ence and technology development, the Administrator 
also wants the space Agency to become a leader in 
quality and the lead federal Agency for quality man- 
agement. 
IS0  9000 consists of a flexible minimum set of 
requirements. It is not a project-oriented specifica- 
tion, nor a guarantee of high quality hardware. It is 
not another “layering of requirements,’’ explained 
Carl Schneider of Code Q. Rather, it is an interna- 
tional conformance standard adopted by most indus- 
trialized nations that can be contractually imposed 
on contractors to assure consistent product quality. 
Quality has always been part of NASA culture. In the 
1970s, NASA’s quality process was defined in NHB- 
5300.4 (1B) dated 1969 to detect defects and make 
corrections. The shift from “inspect in quality” to 
“design in quality” came in the 1980s with more 
emphasis on process control than product. A balance 
was achieved in the 1990s with a further shift from 
motivational programs such as TQM, quality circles 
and zero defects to outputloutcome, the “what” 
instead of the “how to.” IS0  9000, which ensures 
consistency, not quality, thus fits perfectly in a sys- 
tem that requires you to “Say what you do . . . Do 
what you say , . . Prove it.” 
The IS0 standard pertaining to the most comprehen- 
sive Quality Management Systems (IS0 9001) 
addresses 20 elements covering contract review, 
design control, product identification and traceabili- 
ty, inspection and test status, corrective and preven- 
tative action, internal quality audits, training, statisti- 
cal techniques and more. Certification in this area 
has the potential to save suppliers and customers 
considerable cost since it minimizes duplicative cus- 
tomer audits of suppliers. In a global economy, it 
promotes international competition due to its inter- 
nationally accepted certification process. Finally, 
IS0  9001 independently assures compliance of con- 
tractor QMS as it relieves customers of many suppli- 
er audits. 
IS0  9000 is driven by customers’ deliverables and 
key process. It yields a structured and documented 
management system consisting of a quality policy 
manual, consistent procedure across departments, 
intra-departmental work instructions and data con- 
trol. It aligns NASA to commercial best practices in 
quality management by ensuring consistent 
approaches and systems within and between centers. 
NMI 1270.3, “NASA Quality Management Systems 
Policy ( I S 0  9000),” dated December 6, 1995, applies 
to NASA Centers and suppliers. The Administrator’s 
guidance of November 1996 requires Marshall, 
Johnson and Stennis Centers to achieve third party 
certification by April 1988 and all other locations by 
September 1999. Currently, the White Sands Test 
Facility is the only site that is IS0 9000 certified. 
NASA is the first federal Agency to make a commit- 
ment to I S 0  9000 certification, although the 
Department of Defense abolished MIL-Q-9858 in 
September 1996 and issued a policy directive to 
remove impediments of imposing IS0  9000 in con- 
tracts. Also, the Federal Aviation Administration is 
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promoting AS 9000, a derivative of the I S 0  9000. In 
a November 13, 1996 letter to NASA officials and 
directors, the Administrator said: “We must also be 
leaders in the world of quality” as demonstrated 
through IS0 9001 certification. “I am also expecting 
that all our suppliers will step up to the challenge.” 
Carl Schneider 
NASA Headquarters 
Code Q 
Washington, DC 20546 
(202) 358-0913 
carZ.schneider@hq.nasa.gov 
Carl Schneider ended his breakout session with a quo- 
tation from a quality guru: “You don’t have to do this,” 
said W. Edwards Deming, “survival is not compulsory.” 
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Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
New Acquisition Initiatives 
Kenneth A. Sateriale 
NASA has been at the forefront of the acquisition 
reform movement. Many of these reforms will have 
a profound effect on how the Agency does business 
in the near future. 
Ken Sateriale of the Contract Management Division 
in the Office of Procurement describes five key 
acquisition reforms: Performance-B ased Contract- 
ing, Single Process Initiative, Consolidated 
Contracting Initiative, Commercial Item Acquisition 
and Streamlined Source Selection. A brief descrip- 
tion of each follows. 
Performance-Based Contracting consists of four 
elements: the statement of work (SOW) or specifica- 
tion, the appropriate contract type, incentives for 
results (not best efforts) and two types of surveil- 
lance, insight or oversight. 
Writing the SOW involves performance standards 
such as power, speed, weight, size, capacity, accura- 
cy or repeatability that specify the minimum accept- 
able level of performance. The SOW can specify 
input (resources applied), output (product or activity) 
or outcome (ultimate objective). Requirements 
should specify function (the need), performance, 
essential physical characteristics and detail or 
design. If requirements are under-specified, the 
result could be poor performance and expensive 
changes in work requirements; over-specified 
requirements can hamper the flexibility needed to 
meet performance standards. Incentives can be 
offered when performance is above the minimum 
level if it is a significant value to the government, 
worth the additional cost and clearly within the con- 
trol of the contractor. Figure 4 shows when to use 
insight surveillance (a process of gathering a mini- 
mum set of product or process data that provides 
adequate visibility) or the more intrusive on-site 
oversight surveillance such as inspection with 
implicit or explicit review and approval authority. 
Single Process Initiative attempts to reduce con- 
tractor operating costs by transforming multiple gov- 
ernment-unique management and manufacturing 
systems into common, facility-wide processes. 
Using a “block change” modification approach, SPI 
unifies requirements existing on a facility-wide basis 
rather than on a contract-by-contract basis 
The Department of Defense adopted SPI in 
December 1995 and NASA followed suit on May 17, 
1996. For each project, the manager will review each 
proposed block change for approval. A Block 
Change Management Team has been set up at NASA 
Headquarters, 
NASA’s Consolidated Contracting Initiative is a 
process that emphasizes developing, using and shar- 
ing contract resources, whenever practicable, to meet 
Agency objectives. The approach calls for partici- 
pants to capture and list CCI-like contracts, look for 
reasonable conversions (up to the Centers), post 
planned awards to develop new CCI contracts and 
list them on the CCI homepage, such as leasing 
arrangements for photocopy machines. Users then 
check the Bulletin Boards for existing or planned 
contracts before initiating, purchasing or developing 
sealed bids or RFPs. 
Planned changes to CCI include a scrub of other 
Agency contract lists to eliminate “bad” contracts, 
electronic enhancements and additional CCI con- 
tracts from contractors. 
Commercial Item Acquisition is defined as any 
item “of a type” used for nongovernmental purposes 
that has been sold, leased, licensed or offered to the 
general public. It would include such items off the 
shelf requiring customary or minor modifications as 
well as services “of a type” sold competitively based 
on catalog or market prices. Commercial items do 
not include construction nor “true” R&D. 
1 1  
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+ the use of contractor generated data, while  minimizing oversight surveillance. damage resources or destroy or p perty, high or visibility be a No 
I Yes 
+ 
During concept phase, identify 
critical processes, product and 
performance characteristics 
During source selection phase, 
evaluate contractor's risk 
mitigation plan that identifies, 
controls and monitors critical 
processes, products and 
performance characteristics 
Implement oversight and insight 
surveillance until sufficient confidence is 
acquired. Reduce oversight surveillance 1proportional to confidence gained. t yes 
Y > have an acceptable cost, schedule and performance 
No historv for similar 
Work with contractor to ensure 
appropriate process in place 
I I I 
I 
Implement "oversight" surveillance  
performing in-plant process and No 
hardware verifications 
1 
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Figure 4. Developing Surveillance Strategy 
Market research should determine if NASA's need 
can be met by a commercial item, one modified, or 
an item used exclusively for government purposes. If 
one commercial item or source is found, procure- 
ment proceeds in accordance with FAR Part 12, but 
if none is found, the requirement should be reviewed 
to see if it can be restated to permit a commercial 
item. Only Firm Fixed Price (FFP) or FP (EPA) con- 
tract types apply to this process. 
Streamlined Source Selection procedures became 
effective in October 1996 (PN 89-88). They establish 
basic requirements for all procurements over the 
mid-range threshold (usually $1 million) and addi- 
tional requirements of the Source Evaluation Board 
threshold ($50 million). 
Standard evaluation factors include mission suitabil- 
ity, cost/price, and relevant experience and past per- 
formance. The last factor is adjectivally scored 
(Figure 5) ,  but firms without relevant experience or 
past performance can be asked in the RFP to submit 
a list of references or forward a questionnaire to prior 
customers. 
The goals of this and the other new acquisition ini- 
tiatives are to meet user needs faster, reduce user 
time spent on acquisition-related tasks, shorten 
acquisition-related tasks, shorten acquisition lead 
time, minimize contract duplication, save resources 
and improve cooperation with other government 
agencies. Since these initiatives are processes and 
not new contract types, they are compatible with 
most contracts and with other initiatives, depending 
on the amount needed or requested. 
Ken Sateriale 
NASA Headquarters 
Code HC 
Washington, DC 20546 
ken.sateriale@ hq.nasa.gov 
(202) 358-0491 
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Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
Adjective 
Excellent F 91 -1 00 
Very Good 
71 -90 
Good 
51 -70 
Fair 
31 -50 
Poor I 0-30 
Definition 
A comprehensive & thorough proposal of exceptional merit. One or more major strengths. 
No weaknesses or only minor weaknesses. 
Demonstrates overall competence. 
One or more major strengths and strengths outbalance any weaknesses. 
Reasonably sound response. 
There may be strengths or weaknesses, or both. 
As a whole, weaknesses, not off-set by strengths, do not significantly detract from the offeror’s 
response. 
One or more weaknesses. 
Weaknesses outbalance strengths. 
Major weaknesses can probably be improved or minimized. 
~~ 
One or more major weaknesses which are expected to be difficult to improve or minimize. 
Figure 5. Adjective and Point Equivalents 
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Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
TOTAL 
Full Cost Initiative 
103,068 
Joseph R. Struhar 
The purpose of this initiative is to develop and carry out 
full cost accounting, budgeting and management prac- 
tices in NASA in order to support cost-effective mission 
performance through timely, reliable financial informa- 
tion and practices. Full cost management is expected to: 
Motivate project managers to operate 
efficiently 
Report information consistently, internally and 
externally 
Justify NASA’s budget on a program or 
project basis 
Support analysis and decision making for 
management and reimbursement purposes. 
In an environment of constrained budgets and 
increased expectations for oversight and accountabil- 
ity, Joe Struhar, Langley’s Chief Financial Officer, 
notes, full cost practices support compliance with sev- 
eral recent legislative and administrative mandates, 
such as the 1990 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act 
requiring cost information and reporting, and the 1993 
Government Performance & Results Act (GPRA) 
requiring performance and resources measures (cost 
metria). The National Performance Review (NPR) of 
1993 also supports full cost accounting 
In a nutshell, all costs, including civil service labor, are 
accounted for and reported in full cost. This includes 
direct costs, such as contractor-supplied hardware, 
salaries, benefits and travel; service costs, such as 
computing, engineering and fabrication; and “general 
and administrative” costs from the Center, 
Headquarters and the Enterprise. There are no “free” 
resources. 
This is a new way of doing business for government, 
although highly competitive corporations have been 
doing it for years. 
THOUSANDS 
Category 
Direct 
Salaries, Overtime, Benefit 
Travel 
Purchases, Contracts, Grants & Stock 
Project Support 
Service Cost Pools 
Fabrication 
Engineering 
Facility Operations & Test Support 
Computer Services 
Instrument PooVCal Lab 
R&D Utilities (Major Research Facilities) 
Imaging Technology 
General R&D Facility Maint. & Utilities 
General and Administrative 
ACTU ALS 
$ 
82,837 
16,902 
1,090 
742 
1,497 
FULL COST 
$ 
10,235 
180 
83,922 
N/A 
735 
289 
2,315 
11,536 
75 
3,343 
56 
1,005 
7,972 
121,663 
Figure 6. Lewis Research Center Full Cost Prototype-FY95 Activity 
Project: High Speed Research (UPN 537) 
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~~ 
Benefits 
~~ 
Other Pur. & 
Stock FS41 ROS Categories Labor Travel TOTAL 
~ ~~ 
87,349 
2,430 
5,555 
4,510 
6,711 
101 
262 
4,437 
21,936 
Direct Costs 
Service Pools 16,850 
470 
1,078 
873 
1,296 
19 
51 
860 
4,361 
3,430 
39 
70 
34 
91 
2 
3 
53 
565 
531,210 
3,524 
3,132 
10,534 
25,586 
2,335 
6,897 
1,592 
24,919 
6,456 
638,839 
Fabrication 
Engineering 
Fac. Ops/Test Sup. 
Computer Services 
Inst. PooVCal. Lab 
R&D Utility 
(Maj. Res. Fac.) 
Imaging Technology 
General R&D 
Fac. Main/Util. 
6,463 
9,835 
15,951 
33,684 
2,457 
6,897 
1,908 
30,269 
G&A Costs 34,851 11,493 79,662 
TOTAL $1 33,291 $25,858 $4,287 $616,185 $34,851 $1 1,493 $825,965 
Figure 7. Lewis Research Center Summary by Categories & Elements of Cost 
FY95 Activity (000) 
The Full Cost Initiative was adopted by the NASA 
Administrator in 1995. In 1996, the NASA 
Performance Plan included various cost metrics, and 
full cost accounting and reporting for federal agen- 
cies is required by new Federal Accounting 
Standards. That same year, NASA completed proto- 
type testing on the concept at Headquarters, 
Goddard, Lewis and Marshall. An Agencywide test- 
ing phase runs through 1998, the implementation 
phase in FY 1999 and by FY 2000: all of NASA will 
manage, budget and account in a full cost mode. 
and administrative costs of a project. The project man- 
ager has little control of those “overhead” costs. There 
is also potential risk to the technical base, the so-called 
“lightening rod” effect, due to full cost budgeting. 
Nevertheless, the full cost concept continues to 
evolve. The 1996 prototype efforts at Headquarters 
and three Centers indicate that NASA incurred about 
$5.8 billion in direct costs and about $600 million 
each in service costs and G&A costs for a total of 
$7.0 billion. 
The key to full cost management is the project man- 
ager who maintains full cost visibility. This is con- 
sistent with business practice and the NPR’s employ- 
ee empowerment concept. Project managers will be 
able to control or influence more resources, and bud- 
get full costs through projects. Struhar says, “Active 
project manager input will produce the most useful 
tool” for managing projects, and with a strengthened 
project tie to budget requests, the NASA budget 
should become more credible and defendable. 
Before the full cost concept becomes operative in FY 
2000, NASA plans a full year implementation phase 
to test the system and train the staff. 
Full costing ties all costs to projects, the heart of 
NASA, supporting full disclosure and accountability 
for the very first time. 
Joseph R. Struhar 
Chief Financial OfSicer 
Langley Research Center 
Mail Stop 109 
Hampton, VA 23681 
joe. struhar @ larc. nasa. gov 
The downside of full cost accounting is complexity, 
requiring more staff expertise. It is not easy to deter- 
mine service cost pool amounts much less the general 
I 16 
Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
PM Career Development 
Owen C. Gadeken 
“In this era of constant 
change,” says Owen 
Gadeken, “you must 
make the commitment 
to continuous improve- 
ment and development 
of your job-related 
skills. You should not 
only take advantage of 
opportunities offered by 
NASA, but should 
actively seek outside 
and even nontraditional professional development 
opportunities.” 
The goal of his presentation on strategies and 
resources for project management career develop- 
ment was for each participant to take “personal own- 
ership” of one’s career development and “commit to 
acquire the skills you need for the future.” 
He began with a study of “changing times,” noting 
there has been more change in the global economy in 
the past two or three years than in the previous 25 
years. Government continues to reinvent itself with 
new paradigms such as new ways of doing business. 
Instead of a linear career path from the bottom to top, 
in one organization, many are seeking “portable 
careers” based upon developing skill requirements 
and following fast-breaking career opportunities. 
The project management career, Gadeken says, is a 
balance of expertise: technical, managerial and, for 
the best PMs, leadership. Today there are two parts 
to the PM job: tasks (what the job consists of) and 
competencies (what it takes to do the job in an out- 
standing way). “A systematic approach to develop- 
ment should concentrate on both,” he notes. “The 
more complex the job, the more important the com- 
petencies.’’ 
In a nationwide survey of 27 core competencies, pro- 
ject managers favored people skills over technical 
knowledge. Functional managers ranked “technical 
expertise” first, but PMs ranked it 21st. First on the 
list for PMs was “a sense of ownership/mission” that 
functional ranked 17. The other wide discrepancy 
was “political awareness” which PMs ranked 4, and 
functional managers ranked 2 1. 
In addressing PM competencies, Gadeken suggests 
critical incident interviews (with a focus on compe- 
tencies demonstrated on previous jobs), on-the-job 
feedback, 360-degree feedback instruments, and 
training and development exercises such as case stud- 
ies and computer simulations. Career resources 
include libraries, training institutes (such as the Albert 
Einstein Institute on Cape Cod), one’s own Agency 
training opportunities, academia, consultants and 
vendors, and especially professional associations. He 
noted that the top ten percent of leaders read a book a 
month while the top one percent read a book a week. 
Gadeken mentioned three professional associations 
for project managers. The Project Management 
Institute (PMI) offers certification, publications, 
conferences and networking. The International 
Project Management Association (IPMA) is a net- 
work of 26 national associations with a world con- 
gress set for June 1998 in Ljubjana, Slovenia. Project 
World usually offers a June conference in 
Washington, D.C., and a December conference in 
Santa Clara, California. PMI’s Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) covers nine knowl- 
edge areas: time, cost, quality, scope, human 
resources, procurement, communication, risk and, 
most recently added, integration. 
However, most new learning for career development 
takes place on the job. According to a Center for 
Creative Leadership study of 19 1 executives (6 16 
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Competencies 
Sense of Ownership/Mission 
Long-Term Perspective 
Managerial Orientation 
Political Awareness 
Optimizing 
Results Orientation 
Systematic Thinking 
Innovativeness/lnitiative 
Focus on Excellence 
Action Orientation 
Relationship Development 
Coaches Others 
Proactive Information Gathering 
Strategic Influence 
C reativi tiy 
Self Control 
Interpersonal Assessment 
Collaborative Influence 
Critical Inquiry 
Positive expectations 
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Directive Influence 
Competitiveness 
Figure 8. Survey Validation of PM Competencies 
events and 1,547 lessons), nearly half of the lessons 
learned came from Challenging Assignments (48%), 
especially in the fix-it phase. Three other areas were 
split just about evenly (17-18% each). Significant oth- 
ers such as mentors or role models was one category. 
Hardships was another, especially business failures or 
mistakes, missed job opportunities, subordinate per- 
formance problems and career change. The third area 
for optimal career development, according to this one 
survey, included Other Events such as training, early 
I work experience and purely personal experiences. 
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Dr. Gadeken concluded that leadership skills, not 
management, are the key to a competitive edge in the 
challenging project management workplace of the 
future. 
Owen Gadeken 
Defense Systems Management College 
9820 Belvoir RoadlFD-ED 
Ft. Belvoic VA 22060-5565 
oweng @dsmc.dsm.mil 
(703) 825-5425 
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PM Project Database 
Bernard Dixon and Gene Guerny 
The GSFC Resource Encyclopedia was recently 
developed by the Resource Analysis Office in order 
to capture the history of people, projects and science 
at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. Bernard 
Dixon and Gene Guerny showed PMSEP delegates 
the structure and organization of the new encyclope- 
dia and unveiled a new PPMI Lessons Learned CD- 
ROM, first in a series. 
Under “GSFC Projects’’ the Resource Encyclopedia 
takes you through each Goddard project, past and 
present, with a list of instruments, charts and reports. 
Most projects contain an overview and four sum- 
maries: resource, technical, schedule and cumulative 
schedule which includes milestones by percentage of 
months, staff and cost. 
“Organization” displays the GSFC organizational 
chart by code, and each code lists staff and mission. 
Individual information is extracted from the 
“People” window: name, address and perhaps a 
photo and short work history. 
“Science” presents a list of instrument families, 
orbital mechanics, the President’s Quality Award 
application and the GSFC Strategic Plan. Each 
instrument contains a technical description. “Data 
and Information” contains a top level description of 
facility manpower, funds, projects, people and orga- 
nizations. More detailed data is presented under each 
category. “Timeline” presents a graphic representa- 
tion of projects imposed on top of a timeline defined 
by decade. Projects can be sorted alphabetically or 
chronologically, and selection of a project pulls up 
all the information behind the “GSFC Projects” win- 
dow. 
“MAP” is a graphical representation of GSFC build- 
ings and a locator for codes, projects and civil ser- 
vants. The “Gallery” window is populated with pic- 
tures, still and motion, on GSFC projects, people, 
science, the future of the organization and Lessons 
Learned CD-ROMs. 
The “Instruments” window displays the Resource 
Analysis Office parametric and raw data with the 
type of instrument measurement with costs, weight 
and statistical information. “RAO Products” starts 
with a list of material developed by the Resource 
Analysis Office such as parametric cost estimating 
models and a presentation of selected materials. 
“Tour” provides an audio explanation of each win- 
dow and a description of the data available in each 
window. The audio tour can be turned on and off. 
“Configuration” allows an individual to configure 
the computer to access various material along a CD- 
ROM path or a hard drive path. 
The first in a series of interactive CD-ROMs on lessons 
learned was unveiled at the Project Management 
Shared Experiences Program in Virginia Beach. The 
first disk features the Compton Gamma Ray 
Observatory, the heaviest (1 7 tons) astrophysical pay- 
load flown, launched April 5, 1991. Subsequent PPMI 
CD-ROMs will cover COBE, UARS, WE, GOES 
(849), ICEASEE, Orbital Mechanics, Hubble Space 
Telescope, Next Generation Telescope, Jerry Madden’s 
101 Lessons Learned in Project Management and Dr. 
Noel Hinners’ presentation to PMSEP. 
Bernard Dixon 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
Mail Code 152.0 
Greenbelt, MD 20771 
(301) 286-71 79 
Gene Guerny 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
Mail Code 200 
Greenbelt, MD 20771 
(301) 286-6548 
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NASA Fast Track Studies 
Gregory Stover 
During the Advanced Project Management 23 course 
at the Wallops Island Management Education Center 
from April 28 to May 8, 1996, a core group provid- 
ed input for the revised NPD 7120.4 that replaces 
NMI 7120.4, and the NASA Program/Project 
Management Guide, concerning Fast Track Projects. 
(These are defined as small projects under $150 mil- 
lion and completed within three years.) 
Eleven members of PPMI APM-23 interviewed 14 
experts and conducted four data gathering efforts. 
Sixteen other interviews were conducted and a final 
report, NASA APM-23 Special Study Group Fast 
Track Study, dated November 1996, has been pub- 
lished by the NASA ProgramProject Management 
Initiative. 
What Business Are We In? 
Products? 
Services? 
Customers? 
\ \  
Greg Stover of LARC noted that the project life 
cycle template (guidelines) for large projects is cur- 
rently too big to apply to small projects. 
Furthermore, current project guidelines do not fit 
with the “faster, better, cheaper” Agency direction. A 
more flexible structure that allows for innovative 
approaches in project management is needed for Fast 
Track projects. 
Key points from the interviews clustered around 
three issues: Planning, Teamwork and Management. 
These were the common threads in the execution of 
Fast Track Projects. 
“Planning is the key to successful management of a 
Fast Track Project, which is constrained by cost and 
\ 
What Business Should 
We Be In? 
\ 
I 
I 
What is Our Current \ Business Strategy? I \sc 
/7- MGS 96 
( fPathfi:) 
\ 
\ 
What Should Be Our 
Business Strategy? 
Align with Strategy: 
Systems 
Processes 
People 
Organization 
Figure 9. Mars Exploration Program Strategic “Business ’’ Planning Process 
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schedule,” he said. The project managers who made 
this point referred to the conventional approach of 
having sufficient time to react to problems as they 
surfaced and changing the course of the project. 
Conventional projects also mitigated risk through 
heavy spending but the cost-constrained Fast Track 
projects must manage risk aggressively, not avoid it. 
The Fast Track project must be designed to cost, 
designed to schedule and designed to test by asking 
questions about what needs to be tested and doing so 
in the design phase with less schedule disruption. It 
should even be designed for manufacturing by 
involving those responsible for manufacturing in the 
initial design and planning phases. Process engineer- 
ing was also mentioned. 
An area discussed by almost all interviewees was the 
need to manage disruptive outside influences. Most 
elected to incorporate the review process into the 
project and not allow it to be seen as being complet- 
ed outside of the project for upper-level management 
only. All stressed the importance of being able to 
know what was occurring as soon as it begins. This 
meant for most a set of metrics, tailored to the pro- 
ject. Many mentioned Earned Value and 
Performance Measurement methods. Original 
requirements, of course, are frozen unless the cus- 
tomer agrees to lift the cost and schedule restraints, 
and the entire life cycle of a project, including oper- 
ations, is determined at the planning phase of Fast 
Track projects. 
Teamwork was also mentioned by most interviewees 
as indispensable for Fast Track Projects. Specifically 
mentioned were the overall project management 
structure as a team, and the Integrated Product Team 
(OPT) concept. Both are characterized by openness, 
concern for each other, and loyalty to team objec- 
tives. Less visible but equally important is the full 
team’s understanding of the project and its goals. 
Following are some of the benefits of team manage- 
ment as opposed to the traditional leadeddecision 
maker management style: 
Cross-Functional Synergism: When all team 
members have insight and input in the 
planning and design of a Fast Track Project, 
the interfaces and integration activities are 
much smoother. This is especially true in the 
Design-to-Test and Design-for-Manufacturing 
functions. Instead of “throwing the product 
over the fence” for the next function to work 
on, team members are more inclined to 
interact with one another. 
Early Elimination of Problems: Savings in 
cost and schedule occur in Fast Track projects 
because problems are detected early from a 
variety of team member viewpoints. Such 
problems can be solved before sunk costs 
accumulate and schedule redirection is 
needed. 
Money and Time Savings: Early elimination 
of problems leads to changes in design before 
design is frozen or before bending metal, 
when changes are cheaper and easier to make. 
Team involvement early on makes this 
happen. 
Better Design through User Involvement: 
When the user is considered a team member, 
project leaders can accommodate user 
preferences and correct end user 
misconceptions that would require late stage 
changes. 
Making it Work: A team environment is new 
to many managers so the training to lead 
teams and function as a team member is 
absolutely essential. 
Culture Change: To underscore the need for 
team openness and trust, the distinctions 
between civil service and contractor should be 
minimized or eliminated. The NEAR Project, 
for example, worked in a badgeless 
environment. 
Team Selection: Many interviewees pointed 
out the need to select civil service and 
corporate partners who are willing and able to 
work in a team environment. 
22 
Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
Technology 
Development & 
Transfer 
Business 
Advanced 
technology 
Product 
Knowledge Information 
about Mars 
Exploration 
Education 
Inspiration 
Information 
about Mars 
Educational 
products 
Inspiring 
information 
Technology in 
Product 
Technology to 
Produce 
Product 
Customers Features of Product 
Information 
management 
Information 
management 
Information 
presentation 
Information 
presentation 
Technology 
itself 
Mars missions 
Mars missions 
Translation of 
knowledge 
Computer 
graphics, etc. 
Techniques for 
technology 
production 
Understandable 
information 
Synthesized 
information 
In curricula 
Exciting 
Cost-effective 
Scientists, 
everyone 
NASA 
Educators, 
students 
The public 
Missions, 
industry 
Figure IO.  Mars Exploration Program Business Analysis (Summary) 
Working Agreements: Carefully crafted and 
clear working agreements have proven 
effective for cross-function interaction 
between the Fast Track project team and 
lower level functional teams. 
Communications: Teams must communicate 
clearly, quickly and efficiently, supported by 
common electronics messaging. Better 
communication builds team spirit and detects 
problems early. 
Co-Location: Communication on a daily basis 
is desirable for truly effective cross-functional 
integration, and several interviewees indicated 
that co-location should be a requirement for 
Fast Track projects. 
Beyond planning and teamwork, the third general 
cluster of comments from interviewees concerned a 
new form of management for Fast Track projects. 
Day-to-day management to the plan produced at the 
beginning of the team effort is critical. In such a con- 
strained environment, there is little or no time for 
reactive management. Risk management, through 
the effective use of metrics, is preferable to risk 
avoidance in a Fast Track project, for the latter is 
quite expensive and time consuming. 
“Insight vs. Oversight” was a notion put forward by 
several of the interviewees. Fast Track project man- 
agers must be able to work with oversight boards as 
well as team members to create a climate of confi- 
dence, trust and openness. Minimally disruptive 
reviews should address only open issues or “white 
spaces” between different activities, and they should 
be scheduled when the project is ready for them, not 
when the review team is ready. Excess documenta- 
tion can also consume valuable time and resources. 
Only the documentation planned by the team or 
required to proceed to subsequent stages should be 
required. Finally, each team member should be 
viewed as a potential source of cost and schedule 
savings in a climate of continuous improvement on a 
Fast Track project. 
“Fast Track is a new operational concept requiring 
training and sharing of knowledge,” Stover conclud- 
ed. While formal classes can provide the foundation 
for better planning, teamwork and innovative man- 
agement, a Fast Track body of knowledge is also 
desirable, the study asserted. This includes points of 
23 
contact as well as a compilation of lessons learned on 
previous Fast Track projects. The NASA APM-23 
Fast Track Study is a start in that direction. 
Gregory Stover 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Mail Stop 356 
Hampton, VA 23681 
gregorystover @ larc.nasa.gov 
(757) 864-7097 
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Fast Track Projects 
Ray Piper 
Over the years, fast 
track projects have been 
the result of early pro- 
ject delays due to late 
funding or problems on 
the front end. In order 
to rescue the project 
from impending disas- 
ter, the project manager 
would apply crisis man- 
agement and produce 
havoc for a while. The 
project would either suffer disaster or be yanked 
back onto schedule somehow. 
There is a better way, says Ray Piper of Union 
Carbide. He showed PMSEP participants some of 
the proven, successful techniques to organize and 
manage a fast track project. “In the highly competi- 
tive environment in which we all work, these tech- 
niques can be applied to projects such that they can 
be started later or completed earlier than current 
practice,” he said. “This is not a panacea for troubled 
projects but a tool which can be applied in the strate- 
gic planning stage of projects which need to be com- 
pressed due to the derailment of project cost.” 
Piper begins by asking: “What is the ‘Optimum 
Project Schedule’?” The answer: the ideal schedule 
or project cycle time for which the project can be 
installed at the lowest Total Installed Cost (TIC). 
“Any deviation from the Optimum Schedule adds to 
the Total Installed Cost of a project,” he notes. See 
Figure 11, Cost of Compressing a Schedule. 
“Fastrack Projects” at Union Carbide may start later 
because more time is needed to define and reduce 
scope, or to allow for developing technology. More 
time may be needed to study alternative locations, or 
because of cyclic market requirements and product 
priorities. Cash flows that are postponed can allow 
earlier funding of some commercial products. 
Fastrack Projects need to finish early for a variety of 
reasons. Usually the company wants to be first for 
market advantage, such as a new product or if the 
product has a high return or investment (ROI). At 
times the project faces a regulatory deadline, an 
environmental issue, product interruption or a plant 
shutdown. Spending earlier rather than later can 
improve the net present value and reduce project 
cycle time. 
Optimum Project Schedule and Fastrack Projects 
call for different options. In contracting, the opti- 
mum schedule commonly calls for fixed price, reim- 
bursable with incentive and target price with incen- 
tive (for engineering), but Fastracks options include 
reimbursable with incentive (for engineering and 
construction), target price with incentive for both, 
and a unit rate contract for construction. In engineer- 
ing, the Optimum Schedule may start with “frozen” 
scope packages, but Fastracks may start at less than 
100% scope package, issue piecemeal drawings, 
increase the work schedule and double-shift the 
engineering. For equipment purchases, the Optimum 
Schedule calls for in-house or vendor design based 
on cost effectiveness, but Fastracks require in-house 
or vendor design based on schedule, often a single 
source for critical items, in-shop vendor drawing 
70 7 6  80 8 6  8 0  86 IO 10 11 
k W k % k % 0 % 6 % 0 9 h  
P’ 
Schedule Time 
Figure 11. Cost of Compressing a Schedule 
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reviews, stock equipment and double-shift stock 
work. Materials purchases on an optimum schedule 
may call for master price agreements (no bids) or an 
integrated supplier concept, but Fastracks use stan- 
dardized and in stock materials, pay for shop time 
and vendor engineering overtime, use early material 
requisitions and unchecked drawings, use multiple 
fabricators and site fabrication, reduce purchase 
order time and either eliminate or reduce authoriza- 
tion for POs. Finally, in construction, on optimum 
schedule may start with 50% detailed engineering 
complete, spot overtime and a density factor of 1.0. 
Fastrack options include a start with less than 30% 
detailed engineering complete, scheduled overtime 
and double shifts, and a density factor above 1.0. 
The key to success of Fastracks is customer-driven 
project scheduling. The owner clearly specifies crit- 
ical elements and is willing to pay for the fast track- 
ing. With management commitment and full support 
for shared risk, the project manager assembles a ded- 
icated task force in a single location and standardizes 
designs to the greatest extent possible. Money must 
be available and no funding delays. Without studies 
to define “a better way,” Fastracks require a single 
alternative with risks. Keep in mind that the work 
process will vary with the amount of risk an owner 
is willing to take, and with the investment premium 
the owner is willing to pay. Techniques frequently 
used to compress schedules have been effective for 
both Union Carbide and others, but there is no rigor- 
ous proof of the definition of “optimum project 
schedule.” The project team, steering committee and 
project owners continue to evaluate benefits careful- 
ly. 
Ray Piper 
Union Carbide Corporation 
PO. Box 471 
Texas City, IX 77592 
rpiper810@aol.com 
(409) 948-5242 
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The Earned Value Concept 
Wayne E Abba 
Earned Value is not a 
new concept, yet it is 
a significant part of 
the federal acquisition 
reform initiatives being 
implemented through- 
out government. Once 
viewed by many as a 
mere financial report- 
ing requirement, 
Earned Value has come 
into its own as the only 
reliable tool for integrating cost, schedule and tech- 
nical performance management on complex pro- 
grams. 
Wayne Abba, a senior program analyst in the Office 
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, defines Earned Value as a management 
tool that relates resource planning to schedule and 
technical performance requirements. All work on a 
project is planned, budgeted and scheduled in time- 
phased “planned value” increments, constituting a 
baseline for performance measurement. As work is 
performed, it is “earned” as it was planned, in dollars 
or other quantifiable units such as hours of work. The 
earned value should match the planned value. Any 
difference between the two is called a “schedule” or 
“accomplishment” variance. Thus, Earned Value is 
an objective measurement of completed work com- 
pared to planned and actual values for the same work. 
The Earned Value concept emerged in the 1960s but 
did not have the computer hardware and software 
support to make it work effectively. Today it is 
endorsed by the Department of Defense and the 
Project Management Institute, and it is among the 
“best practices” of Boeing, Lockheed, Motorola and 
Delco. The ANSI considers it an industry “standard.” 
Earned Value starts with the control account: plan, 
budget, schedule and corrective action. The 
Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled (BCWS) is com- 
pared to the Budgeted Cost for Work Performed 
(BCWP) and the Actual Cost of Work Performed 
(ACWP.) Any difference between BCWP and BCWS 
provides a schedule variance, and any difference 
between BCWP and ACWP provides a cost variance. 
From those two figures you can project the cost per- 
formance and estimate-at-completion. 
Another way of picturing this is with questions. 
What’s the plan? (Budget or Target Cost) What 
should be done by now? (BCWS) What is done so 
far? (BCWP) What did it cost to do it? (ACWP) 
What is the schedule variance? (BCWP minus 
BCWS) What is the cost variance? (BCWP minus 
ACWP) What is the Cost Performance Index (CPI)? 
(BCWP divided by ACWP) What is the estimate at 
completion? Estimates at cost of completion can be 
calculated or evaluated using the performance 
indices. 
Abba says that although the “Earned Value 
Management Systems” (EVMS) replaced the previ- 
ous cost/schedule control criteria at DOD in 
December 1996, Earned Value is not a “system.” 
Rather, it is a comprehensive planning process that 
DEFINE THE WORK 
Figure 12. The Earned Value Concept Summary 
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Control Account Budget = 100 Budgeted Cost for 
(BCWS) 
Work Scheduled 38 
- 
Budgeted Cost for 
Work Performed 
Estimate at Completion = ? 
33 
Figure 13. What did it cost to do it? 
Actual Cost of Work Perjiormed 
(BCWP) 
covers the entire SOW, schedules activities and allo- 
cates resources. It is not a reporting system, contract 
administration, cost analysis or accounting system 
but rather blends with the contractor’s own manage- 
ment system. Soon after contract award, program 
managers are now expected to perform an Integrated 
Baseline Review to assure that the contract perfor- 
mance measurement baselines capture the entire 
technical scope of work consistent with schedule 
requirements, and that adequate resources have been 
assigned. Such a review, supported by Earned Value 
experts, should improve the cost, schedule and tech- 
nical performance management and reduce the num- 
ber of reviews. 
- 
In 1995, the United States signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Canada and Australia to advo- 
Actual Cost of 
(ACWP) 
Work Performed 37 
- 
cate “improved project management in both govern- 
ment and industry, based on effective risk assess- 
ment and integrated management of cost, schedule 
and technical performance objective, using earned 
value as the integrating tool.” Since then, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and New Zealand have expressed 
similar interest. 
For more information on Earned Value, point your 
Web browser to e www.acq.osd.mil/pm >. 
Wayne Abba 
Oflice of Secretary of Defense 
3020 Defense Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20301 -3020 
abbawf @ acq. osd.mi1 
(703) 695-51 66 
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Value-Added Metrics 
Gilbert L. Roth 
The terms “metric” and “metrics” have been used, 
abused and misused for many years in project man- 
agement. Over the past three years, Gil Roth has con- 
ducted in-house workshops on metrics at 
Headquarters and NASA Centers. Currently the 
National Security Industrial Association and the 
Aerospace Industries Association are preparing a 
document to show how suppliers use a set of critical 
metrics to measure, control and improve their prod- 
ucts and services in terms of adding value to perfor- 
mance, cost and schedule. 
A metric is a quantitative measurement of an activi- 
ty, results and/or reaction. Under activity, a meeting 
schedule is a typical example: Did we do what we 
planned to do when we planned to do it? Under 
results, after we met schedule, did we deliver a good 
product? Test and inspection should measure those 
results. Under reaction, attempts are made to recover 
to schedule status or improve receiving inspection 
results: What, if anything, should we do, based on 
activity and/or results? 
Roth’s next question: How do we measure value 
added? Mainly through effectiveness and efficiency. 
If work does the right things on time (effectiveness) 
with the right resources (efficiency) in the right way 
( quality), the organization will experience high or 
increasing productivity and the product or process 
will experience added value in performance, cost and 
schedule. Key questions for effectiveness include 
knowing your customers and their requirements: 
How do I measure and improve my performance 
against these requirements? Key considerations for 
efficiency include focusing on processes and finding 
ways to make better use of our resources by reducing 
or eliminating duplication, delay, unneeded com- 
plexity and unnecessary work. 
A “good” metric adds value to the process or activi- 
ty but it is also easy to comprehend by peers. It 
stands by itself and does not require clarification. 
The numerics can be easily substantiated, the table or 
chart fits the story being told, and the headings state 
a clearly understood numeric. (See Figure 14, Basic 
Tools.) It presents sufficient information to allow a 
timely and reasonably well-founded decision by pro- 
viding a clear picture of strengths and weaknesses, 
an early warning for rate of approach (ROA) and 
some indication when corrective decisions can be 
made. 
A “bad” metric requires excessive manipulation of 
input data (including mathematical solutions) and 
makes it difficult to obtain data or information in a 
timely manner. So, why measure in the first place? 
“Measurement enables us to evaluate our progress 
objectively, with facts, rather that subjectively,” Roth 
says. “We recognize that it is sometimes difficult to 
avoid ‘subjectivity’ in measurement. The goal is to 
drive toward specific quality elements that can be 
quantified and expressed numerically.” 
Metrics also establish a baseline and enable us to 
determine progress or slippage towards goals. They 
should be able to tell us if we are satisfying customer 
requirements and if processes are working or not. 
In sum, measurement is established for customer 
requirement and use of resources. Selected metrics 
should contribute to cost containment but there are 
some don’ts to consider: 
Don’t have too many. 
Don’t make them more complicated than 
they need to be. 
Don’t lose sight of the goal. 
Metrics become increasingly significant in NASA’s 
changing environment from a growing budget to a 
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Breakout Sessions: New Directions 
fixed one, large programs to smaller projects, proven 
to new technology, politically to economic driven 
and from low risk to an acceptance of more risk. 
Gilbert Roth 
NASA Headquarters 
Code QT 
Washington, DC 20546 
gilbert. roth @ hq.nasa.gov 
(202) 358-0559 
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Global Work 
Mary O’Hara-Devereaux 
The Institute for the Future is a spinoff from the 
Rand Corporation of about 30 years ago, and Mary 
O’Hara-Devereaux is co-author of Global Work: 
Bridging Distance, Culture & Time (Jossey-Bass, 
1994). She spoke on the “shifts, shadows and guide- 
posts” to 10 years out, and their implications for pro- 
ject management in the next millennium. She orga- 
nized her presentation under six topics. 
2. 
3. 
1. Global Context. Over the next few years we 
expect to see the rise of the third-world 
economies, especially in Asia. Thus, expect more 
multinational firms, joint ventures and alliances. 
International agreements will be more common 
on projects. 
4. 
Organizational Shifts. In contrast to oldline 
American organizations, today’s company is 
only half focused on core business; 38% of com- 
pany functions are contracted out and another 
12% are working in space, not in place. Is the 
new fishnet organization flexible or fragmented? 
Transformation of Work: Expect to work more, 
not less, than 40 hours per week in this highly 
charged competitive economy. Unions or brokers 
will bundle workers who are loyal to jobs, not 
employers. 
Cultural Challenge. Instead of command and 
control, expect more teamwork, more diversity 
Figure 15. DK Edward J. HofJinan and Mary O’Hara-Devereaux at the PMSEP 
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in the workplace, more “process facilitation” and 
more emphasis on information management in a 
cross-cultural environment. 
5. Teams and Technology Challenges. Managing 
people in global teams will involve a process that 
begins with orientation and trust building to 
goalhole selection and commitment to high per- 
formance and renewal. 
6. Guiding Principles. The new project manager 
will have to Iearn how to communicate more 
effectively, use cultural guides, build trust, 
beware the absence of context, redesign the work 
processes, manage with milestones, be creative 
with technology, be fluent with cross-cultures 
and create “third way” strategies (blend, cobble). 
In her book, O’Hara-Devereaux describes four new 
competencies of the global manager. First and fore- 
most is a multicultural perspective, transcending the 
barriers of language and behavior. Technical compe- 
tence will still be important, but teams will have to 
be managed with “groupware,” software for groups 
in a computer-mediated society. 
A third core competency for tomorrow’s project 
manager will be process facilitation, easing the 
sometimes painful but always complex processes by 
which teams and organizations set out to do their 
work. Finally, team leadership skills will become 
increasingly important to accomplish time driven, 
task-oriented, cross-functional jobs. Top-down com- 
panies and isolated individuals working on common 
goals cannot handle these jobs as well as a real pro- 
ject team. 
O’Hara-Devereaux ended with an observation that 
the happiest people she has encountered recently in 
the course of her research have been “RIFed.” The 
saddest were those who were left behind.in a down- 
sized organization. 
Mary O’Hara-Devereaux 
Institute for the Future 
657 Mission St., Ste. 601 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
mohara @ iftf org 
(415) 233-9518 
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Insideout Coaching 
George Knight 
George Knight served as a human resources director 
for Hercules Aerospace Company and was a research 
assistant to Steven R. Covey, an internal training 
consultant to Franklin Quest Corporation and project 
manager for the American Quality Foundation’s 
“Stuff Americans Are Made Of’ quality and innova- 
tion initiative. 
Insideout is one response to staff reductions, 
increased competition, work redesign, changing skill 
requirements, the loss of familiar ways of doing 
things, loss of power or authority, and “never enough 
time.” Coaching is needed to eliminate fear due to 
low trust, low morale, uncertainty, resistance to 
change, a sense of powerlessness and an unhealthy 
focus on self rather than the work at hand. Sports is 
a good analogy for this syndrome because it simpli- 
fies the complex-no excuses. 
When pressure mounts, we have three responses: 
fight, flight or what Knight calls “hyperperfor- 
mance.” The first two put blame on others, but the 
third response is fun (exhilarating, actually), fast 
(quick) and focused. Most of us can recall a hyper- 
performance experience in sports, school, business 
or family. Wouldn’t it be great if we could operate in 
this mode more often? 
Czikszentmihali calls it “flow,” that marvelous state 
of mind between anxiety and depression, worry and 
boredom, a state of peak performance. Insideout 
Coaching “takes valued people from where they are 
to where they want to go” by getting them to 
G.R.O.W. 
G.R.O.W. Stands for Goal, Reality, Options and 
Way. The coach encourages the project member to 
focus on a S.M.A.R.T. (Specific, Measurable, 
Agreed to, Reality-based and Time-phased) goal. If 
the goal is complex, the coach will “chunk” it down 
into manageable and achievable objectives. 
Reality sets in when the team member tries to 
explain why earlier attempts failed and what the 
obstacles were. Is the goal still realistic? Smart? 
If so, you can explore your Options. There are usual- 
ly more than you realize at first. A good coach can 
help you brainstorm them. Finally, coach and player 
select an Option and develop a plan of action within 
a realistic time frame. In other words, the Way for- 
ward should also be S.M.A.R.T. 
Then it’s a matter of practice. Like any good coach, 
the Insideout coach tries to get the personal best 
from the player for breakthrough hyperperformance. 
George Knight 
Insideout Development Inc. 
95 North 490 West 
American Fork, UT 94003 
(801) 492-1001 
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Team-Based Problem Solving 
Tom Logsdon 
“Beyond Brainstorming: Enhancing Your 
Productivity by Learning to Formulate Simple, 
Creative Solutions” is the expanded version of Tom 
Logsdon’s presentation to the PMSEP. An aerospace 
engineer retired from Rockwell , Logsdon has just 
finished his 28th book, Understanding Orbital 
Mechanics, for John Wiley & Sons. 
Logsdon offered two ways of solving a problem, 
sprinkled with examples from his own experience 
and those of innovative organizations. His theory is 
that teams can learn to be more creative through 
shared workshop experiences. 
Break the problem apart and put it back together 
again. “Simple, well-formulated problems lead to 
practical, creative solutions,” Logsdon says. He sug- 
gests ordinary language, and pointed questions. For 
example, “Our company was once a fun place to 
work. But with the recent cutbacks, the morale has 
plummeted. How can we make Widgets International 
a fun place to work again?” He suggests a brain- 
TUE ARC OF CREATlVITY 
Figure 16. The Arc of Creativity 
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storming technique known as “Mind Mapping” with 
balloon diagrams, where one idea leads to another 
and clusters are formed around major components of 
the problem. Leave room at the bottom of the page to 
list solutions or action items that occur to you as you 
expand your mind mapping. 
Take a fresh look at the interfaces. An interface 
emerges when two dissimilar things come together. 
They often appear in the mind mapping balloons. 
Logsdon suggests using the bottom of the page again 
for making notes on how you might solve the prob- 
lem by moving, modifying or deleting one or more of 
the interfaces in the balloon diagram, or employing an 
interface for a useful purpose. For example, Gillette 
moved the interface between blade and handle of the 
old straight razor and came up with the safety razor 
with disposable blades. Bic came along later and 
deleted the interface, rejoining blade and handle once 
again, making the whole thing disposable. The 
Denver Boot modified the interface between scofflaw 
and police by eliminating the impound lot. And Henry 
Ford used an interface for a useful purpose by speci- 
fying the exact size of boards used in crates by sup- 
pliers. He even asked them to drill holes at precise 
distances along the boards so they could be taken 
apart and installed as floorboards in his Model T, a car 
even his workers could thus afford. 
Logsdon has several techniques he explains in longer 
sessions. You can reformulate the problem, for 
example. After mind mapping and interface analysis, 
the problem can clarify itself and become easier to 
solve. You can also “visualize a fruitful analogy” like 
Eli Whitney did with the cotton gin after he saw a 
kitten sticking its paw through a picket fence. Or, 
you could “search for useful order-of-magnitude 
changes” such as graphical techniques in a cook- 
book, replacing the drawn out directions with pic- 
tographs. Finally, he suggests, “Be alert to happy 
serendipity.” Ben Franklin may have proposed day- 
light savings time as a way for Paris shopkeepers to 
save candles, but the idea did not catch on until the 
turn of this century when people realized that family 
outdoor activities and sporting events could fill a 
summer evening quite happily. 
More detail on these and other brainstorming tech- 
niques and problem-solving strategies can be found 
in Tom Logsdon’s popular book, Breaking Through 
(Addison-Wesley, 1993). A new mass-market edition 
is in production, to be issued as The Midas Touch: 
Polishing Your Simple, Creative Solutions So 
Everything You Touched Turns to Pure Gold. 
Tom Logsdon 
Logsdon & Associates 
235 Clipper Way 
Seal Beach, CA 90740 
tlogsdon @aol.com 
(562) 431-3334 
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NO Key Practices Defined Level 1 “IN IT1 AL” 
Capability Maturity Model 
Random successes achieved via heroics 
in an environment of chaos. 
George Albright 
The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is a precise, 
verifiable representation of an organization or proj- 
ect that is highly effective in producing software. 
The CMM is an ongoing project of the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) a federally funded 
research and development center at Carnegie Mellon 
University. 
Like IS0  9000, Certified CMM conformance is 
often cited as a contractual requirement and is 
becoming widely recognized and accepted as a stan- 
dard of excellence. However, achieving a maturity 
level takes time, organizational commitment, sus- 
tained effort, budget and culture building. 
Level 5 
“OPTIMIZING” 
Level 4 
“MANAGED” 
Level 3 
“DEFINED” 
Level 2 
“REPEATABLE” 
George Albright, the Headquarters program execu- 
tive for Hubble Space Telescope flight science oper- 
ations and on-orbit servicing since 1993, brings his 
30 years of experience at Grumman to explain CMM 
to the NASA community. “Software technology has 
outpaced NASA’s management capability for soft- 
ware,” he notes. “Many program and project man- 
agers lack the technical background for exercising an 
equivalent degree of management insight on soft- 
ware as they do in hardware.” 
I 
I 
I 
Nevertheless, with CMM, software professionals can 
develop and improve their ability to identify, adopt 
and use sound management and technical practices 
Defect Prevention 
Technology Change Management 
Process Change Management 
Quantitative Process Management 
Software Quality Management 
Organization Process Focus 
Organization Process Definition 
Training Program 
Integrated Software Management 
Software Product Engineering 
Intergroup Coordination 
Peer Reviews 
Requirements Management 
Software Project Planning 
Software Project Tracking and Oversight 
Software Subcontract Management 
Software Quality Assurance 
Software Configuration Management 
Organization executes continuous 
and measurable software process 
improvement. 
Organization has a quantitative 
understanding of both the software 
process and the software products 
being built. 
~ ~~ 
Organization establishes an 
infrastructure that institutionalizes 
effective S/W engineering and 
management processes across all 
projects. 
Organization has tools by which 
individual projects can establish 
basic project management controls. 
<1% 
- 3% 
- 6% 
- 90% 
Figure 17. The Key Process Areas 
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for delivering quality software that will meet 
requirements on schedule and within budget. 
Through CMM, an organization can determine the 
maturity or richness of their software and identify the 
most critical issues for improving software quality 
and process. 
Basically, there are five maturity levels in the CMM. 
(See Figure 17, Key Process Areas.) Level 1 is the 
“Initial” or immature organization where projects 
operate in varying degrees of chaos. Here, there is 
low confidence in the organization’s ability to repeat 
a successful project. It may take two years for such a 
group to achieve Level 2. 
The second CMM level is “Repeatable” because 
individual projects can establish basic management 
controls in the planning, tracking and oversight of 
software. Moving on to Level 3, “Defined,” may 
take a year or two as the infrastructure is built to 
institutionalize effective software engineering and 
management processes across all projects. Training 
activities are also provided to develop skills and 
knowledge needed to perform software management. 
About a year later, Level 4, “Managed,” can be 
achieved when an organization has a quantitative grasp 
of software products and processes. The project’s soft- 
ware activities are planned and controlled quantitative- 
ly, and measurable goals for quality are defined. 
Level 5, “Optimizing,” is quite difficult to achieve, 
and not enough data is available to predict how long 
it would take to arrive from Level 4. Nevertheless, 
Level 5 is characterized by continuous software 
process improvement. Common causes of defects are 
prioritized and systematically eliminated. New tech- 
nologies are transformed into normal practice across 
the organization. 
For more information, Albright recommends The 
Capability Maturity Model, Guidelines For 
Improving the SofnYare Process by the Software 
Engineering Institute, published by Addison Wesley. 
He also suggests that the Enterprise Offices encour- 
ages Software Capability Evaluation (SCE) certifica- 
tion from SEI, and that the Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance establish formal NASA require- 
ments for software training and certification, along 
the lines of that already offered for IS0  9000. Finally 
he suggests that PPMI expand offerings in Systems 
Engineering and Software Acquisition Management 
to include formal SCE and CMM certification 
courses. 
George Albright 
NASA Headquarters 
Code SD 
Washington, DC 20546 
george. albright @ hq.nasa. gov 
(202) 358-0356 
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Program Development 
David Pugh 
Veteran business consultant and trainer David h g h  
created the Program Development Course and the 
materials for Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers such as the Jet Population 
Laboratory. He defines Program Development as a 
“philosophy and a set of skills” to help “define your 
role, focus your activities, discover legally and ethi- 
cally permissible opportunities for serving sponsors, 
determine your sponsors’ needs, and inform current 
and prospective sponsors of your unique capabilities.” 
Properly done, the PD process should “inform indus- 
try, the citizenry and federal agencies of your organi- 
zation’s mission, strengths and unique capabilities.” 
It should furthermore “establish alliances and partner- 
ships with industry, other FFRDCs, not-for-profits 
and universities to serve the needs of the nation.” 
I 
1 
The PD process begins with strategic planning, 
knowing what program to develop. At the core of 
this effort is the SWOT analysis of Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats to you, com- 
petitors and sponsor. The resulting strategic program 
plan consists of vision and mission statements, 
assumptions and analysis, realistic strategic objec- 
tives and an implementable plan. 
Sponsor Identification and Analysis follow, identify- 
ing potential sponsors and understanding their needs. 
People involved usually play one of six roles: deci- 
sion maker, advisor, user, administrator, champion or 
external such as lawyer, banker or consultant. 
Strategic Positioning follows, keeping potential 
sponsors informed of your unique, special capabili- 
ties. These information modes are designed to reach 
the three types of learners. Visual people prefer 
brochures, videos, white papers and line presenta- 
tions. Auditory learners may prefer briefings, panels, 
telephone and meetings. Kinesthetic people may pre- 
fer prototypes, hands on demonstrations, site visits 
and interactive media. 
Opportunity Assessment, determining what opportu- 
nities to pursue, comes next. David Pugh suggests a 
meeting with the sponsor, spending 40% of your 
time asking questions about the sponsor’s needs, 
requirements and expectations; 50% of your time lis- 
tening (an acquired behavior); and 10% informing 
them of your capabilities and solutions. 
Capture Planning results chiefly in writing a propos- 
al that can consist of an executive summary, intro- 
duction, technical background, objective, scope of 
work, schedule, management and personnel, report- 
ing and deliverables, financial requirements, disposi- 
tion of property, ES&H issues, classification and 
security, and technical references. The all important 
executive summary should consist of one third text, 
one third graphics and one third white space. 
Finally, the Ongoing Relationship Management 
phase leads to a mutually satisfying long term rela- 
tionship, “creating sponsor delight” without driving 
up costs. Know your sponsor’s business. Help the 
sponsor respond to opportunities and threats. Provide 
value engineering and make value-added tangible. 
Identify what’s wrong, not who’s wrong. 
“Everything should be made as simple as possible 
but not simpler,” he notes. 
“The Value of Excellence” is also important to Pugh. 
Since people do not buy products or services per se, 
they buy hopes, expectations, relationships. 
Therefore, he suggests five basic approaches to 
Program Development: 
1. Differentiation, how you differ from competition 
2. Niche, where you fill a narrow area of technical 
uniqueness 
3. Full Service, your multidisiplinary approach to 
deliver more expertise quicker 
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4. Cost, lower because of existing technologies and 
facilities 
5 .  TeamingPartnership, your cooperative alliances 
with universities, laboratories, other agencies, or 
private industry. 
The bottom line in Program Development is higher 
quality, better performance, state-of-the-art technol- 
ogy, cost effective solutions, lower risk, faster deliv- 
ery, smart facilities, flexibility, expandability and 
I adaptability. 
For more information, Pugh recommends William 
Davidow’s Marketing High Technology (New 
York: The Free Press, 1986) and Theodore Levitt, 
The Marketing Imagination (same publisher, 
1983). 
David Pugh 
Self-Management Institute 
RO. Box 1287 
Durango, CO 81302 
pugh @smidro.com 
(970) 385-4955 
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High Performance Organization: Saturn 
James L. Lewandowski 
Jim Lewandowski spent 35 years at General Motors. 
His last assignment was vice president for human 
resources on the Saturn Project in Spring Hill, 
Tennessee. Now he specializes in organizational cul- 
ture and change efforts using Saturn-like concepts 
and principles. He left Saturn in 1990, just as the first 
cars rolled out. “If you do what you’ve always 
done,” he says, “you get what you always got.” 
That’s why the Saturn Project started with a clean 
sheet. 
The Saturn Project transformed him from a manager 
to a leader. He notes, “I had to learn to operate out of 
my comfort zone.” He and six other GM executives 
were given this assignment without being told why 
they were specifically selected, nor how to create a 
new car and a new company concept. 
Saturn was to be a high performance operation, and 
instead of mere customer satisfaction, the group of 
seven committed themselves to “customer enthusi- 
asm.” Besides changing buying patterns, this crew 
had to regain the market share lost to the Japanese 
and change the worker organizations. The chief engi- 
neer bought a fleet of Hondas and Mitsubishis and 
told his engineers to “drive ’em until you puke.” 
Lewandowski was in charge of relocating thousands 
of families from GM plants across the country and 
dealing with their unions in this new way of doing 
business. Before Saturn, his job in Detroit was to 
“screw the union and not let them screw us,” but in 
Tennessee, things were different. “People want to be 
involved in the decisions that affect them.” There were 
differences of opinion with the UAW, but “we drank 
Figure 18. Jim Lewandowski at the PMSEP in Virginia Beach 
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beer afterwards, never held a grudge and never tried to 
get even.” The result was a total of only three written 
grievances in the first five years, filed by the union to 
avoid unfair labor practices. Lewandowski found it 
“much harder to be a coach or champion than a Boss.” 
His biggest challenge was to move thousands of 
union families from Detroit to a rural community in 
a dry county of a right-to-work state. “High perfor- 
mance companies live and die by mission state- 
ments,” he noted, and his was simple and clear: “No 
teen suicides.” Families, thus, assumed an impor- 
tance unheard of before in an organization on the 
move, and kids got a lot of attention during the big 
change. Saturn did have a rather high rate of divorce 
among couples, but Lewandowski figures that many 
urban folks brought some problems with them to the 
country. “People come first,” was their slogan. 
“Some people never learn to trust though,” 
Lewandowski said. So, what do you do? Fire them? 
“No,” he said. “Coach them, counsel them and hope 
that they quit or retire soon.” His first challenge was 
to get his fellow executives to stop wearing neckties. 
I 
Another big change for GM was this Tennessee 
transformation into a learning organization. “We 
called Spring Hill a ‘campus’ for we were continu- 
ously learning,” he recalls. Trying to involve the 
whole family in Saturn events and celebrations was 
a priority. 
Lewandowski drew applause from the delegates to 
the Project Management Shared Experiences 
Program when he said: “You know, the problem is 
we rely too much on metrics” and not enough on 
people. He advises project managers to “involve 
your stakeholders in any change process.” 
Change and continuous improvement are part of the 
culture at Saturn. Employees are even required to get 
90 hours of training per year, with part of their 
riskheward compensation tied to their objective. 
Lewandowski remembers the glory days of Saturn, 
but faced with the prospect of returning to Detroit to 
push papers, he chose to keep the dream alive by 
telling the Saturn story over and over again, hoping 
that his experience-based perspective will assist 
leaders and managers confronted by the cross cur- 
rents of change. 
James Lewandowski 
People Systems International 
550 W Flamingo DE, Ste. 204 
Venice, FL 34285 
(941) 484-0111 
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Achieving Credibility as a Project Manager 
Hal Mooz 
Hal Mooz was co-developer of an innovative gov- 
ernment/industry Project Management Training 
Course, and he has trained more than 5,000 high- 
technology project managers. A graduate of Stevens 
Institute of Technology, he was a project manager 
and systems engineer at Lockheed before he found- 
ed CSM. His new book with Kevin Forsberg, 
Visualizing Project Management, was published by 
John Wiley & Sons in 1996. 
Leadership is the most important factor in the suc- 
cessful management of projects, Mooz asserts, and 
the most important element of leadership is credibil- 
ity. Citing Jim Kouzes and Barry Posner’s book, 
Credibility (Jossey-Boss, 1993), Mooz claims that 
credibility is earned and depends on the project man- 
ager’s competency as observed, valued and appreci- 
ated by stakeholders, those who can affect or are 
affected by the project. 
He laments the fact that few project managers are 
trained in systems engineering, and few systems 
engineers are trained in project management. Fewer 
yet belong to both the PMI and INCOSE. Yet, the 
skills and knowledge of both are needed to achieve 
the competency and earn the credibility to manage 
projects with clarity and purpose. 
Four things are essential to project management, 
according to CSM. 
1. Common Project Vocabulary. Projects that do not 
define their terms and explain their jargon are 
vulnerable to serious miscommunication that can 
I The Four Essentials of I Project Management 
I 
Common Vocabulary 
I 
Teamwork 
I 
The Project 
Wanagement Elements 
Tailored for the nation, 
industry, and project 
environment. 
Concurrent timely 
involvement of Users, 
Buyers, Producers, 
Suppliers, Operators, 
and Maintenance 
stakeholders. 
The sequential Management methods 
management approach situationally applied to 
to achieving the 
project’s objectives. throughout the project 
manage the project 
cycle. 
Figure 19. The Four Essentials of Project Management 
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lead to mistakes, even disasters. A project dictio- 
nary or glossary, in hard copy and soft, is essen- 
tial. A competent project manager gains credibil- 
ity through mastery and mentoring of such 
vocabulary. 
2. The Project Cycle. Competent project managers 
can also earn credibility by involving stakehold- 
ers in the development of a coordinated project 
cycle. Many professional project management 
organizations have their own standards or tem- 
plate of a project cycle, based upon their pre- 
ferred approach. CSM prefers the “Vee” format 
for the technical aspect of the project cycle to 
show the sequence for system or product decom- 
position, definition, integration and verification. 
3. Ten Project Management Elements. The compe- 
tent project manager earns credibility by demon- 
strating skill and tool proficiency in each of the 
following categories: 
Requirements must be created and managed. 
Organization options, ranging from function- 
al and matrix to integrated teams and “skunk 
works,’’ must be applied to the situation. 
Project Team selection must include the right 
mix of skills and attributes. 
Project Planning should be an ongoing 
process. 
Risks and Opportunities must be continuous- 
ly identified and evaluated and then mitigat- 
ed and enhanced, respectively. 
Project Control should be proactive and reac- 
tive, to ensure that planned events happen 
and unplanned events do not. 
7) Project Visibility includes physical tech- 
niques like MBWA and electronic techniques 
like Email, FAX and videoconferencing. 
8) Project Status should involve tools like 
earned value to detect unacceptable variances 
and determine the need for corrective action. 
9) Corrective Action may include overtime, alter- 
nate technical approaches or new leadership. 
10) Project Leadership, the most important ele- 
ment, is based on credibility. “The competent 
leader makes sure the team is doing the right 
things before making sure things are being 
done right,” Mooz says. 
4. Project Teamwork. The fourth essential of effec- 
tive project management is teamwork, not just 
individuals working together to achieve a com- 
mon goal but rather mutual respect and trust, a 
common code of conduct, shared rewards, and 
team spirit and energy among all the project 
shareholders. Projects often fail, notes Mooz, 
because of adversarial relationships. Timely 
involvement of users, buyers, producers, suppli- 
ers, operators and maintenance stakeholders can 
reduce conflict considerably. 
Beyond technical management, the savvy project 
manager must also manage the budget and business 
aspects of a project. Leadership, however, is the 
force that inspires and motivates the team to accom- 
plish their personal and collective best, and effective 
leadership is based on credibility. 
Hal Mooz 
Center for Systems Management 
19046 Pruneridge Ave. 
Cupertino, CA 95014 
(408) 255-8090 
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The Cypress Freeway Relocation 
Michael Chan 
Michael Chan is the acting construction manager of 
the $900 million reconstruction of the Cypress 
Freeway in Oakland, involving seven major con- 
tracts and 15 smaller ones since the October17, 1989, 
earthquake. 
Forty-one people lost their lives on the elevated 
highway that leads to the San Francisco Bay Bridge. 
Chan has to coordinate the work with more than 15 
federal and state agencies, but thanks to fast track 
construction schedules, Interstate 880 to Westbound 
1-80 was expected to open to traffic in the summer of 
1997. Eastbound freeway traffic is expected to flow 
by winter of 1998. 
Michael Chan 
California Department of Transportation 
1121 7th St. 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 286-7395 
Figure 20. Michael Chan shows a slide of a car on the elevated Cypress Freeway in 1989 about to fall 
through 
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Figure 21, Cypress Replacement Project 
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Construction of the Hong Kong Airport 
Tudor Walters 
Tudor Walters is the Consultant Project Manager for 
the massive Hong Kong Airport Core Programme, a 
$21 billion project with a very tight timeframe, a 
wide variety of engineered components and a high 
level of inter-contract dependencies. To further com- 
plicate matters, the British were about to turn their 
six million citizens and the airport project over to the 
mainland Chinese for governance, following a 99- 
year lease. 
A single runway with no opportunity to expand sup- 
ports the current Kai Tak airport, overburdened with 
the world’s third largest number of international pas- 
sengers and air cargo tonnage, located in the densely 
populated Kowlson area. Noise pollution is a serious 
problem, so developers decided on a site just off the 
north coast of Lantau Island, 30 km from Hong 
Kong’s central business district. The two new run- 
ways would be partly on land, mostly on reclamation, 
stretching out into the bay off the fishing village of 
Tung Chung. 
The cost of the expressways and railway to the new 
landing site would exceed that of the actual airport, 
but would also achieve a number of long-standing 
planning objectives and development needs. The 
roadrail double-deck Tsing Ma suspension bridge 
stretches to the island, longer than the Verranzano 
Narrows Bridge, and the Kap Shui Mun cable stayed 
box girder bridge enables a 23-minute rail ride to 
central city. Tunnels, terminals and elevated high- 
ways were built by a wide range of international con- 
tractors using a 30% proportion of imported labor. 
“Exceptional projects demand exceptional client and 
governmental responses,” he said. By 1994 all con- 
tracts were awarded after debt-to-equity ratios for 
the airport and airport railway (being developed by 
wholly owned government corporations) were 
worked out among the UK, PRC and Hong Kong 
governments. Lump-sum fixed price contracts were 
awarded with strict penalties for schedule slips. On 
alternate Saturday mornings the contract managers 
would meet with government department heads 
related to the project to deal with issues, concerns, 
regulations and needs. Integrated management teams 
trimmed the overall budget twice, saving $1 billion. 
As of April 1997, every contract was running on 
budget. The freeways were open, and the airport 
platform was dredged and reclaimed, with terminal 
construction well underway. The new airport, within 
270 minutes of half the world’s population, along 
with its railway, is expected to open April 1998. 
Tudor Wal te rs 
Bechtel Group, Inc. 
50 Beale Street 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
(415) 768-0379 
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NASA’s Faster, Better, Cheaper 
Dr. Noel W. Hinners 
Dr. Noel Hinners is vice president of Flight Systems 
at Lockheed Martin in Denver, having left NASA in 
1989 as Associate Deputy Administrator and Chief 
Scientist. Earlier he served as NASA Associate 
Administrator for Space Science, Director of the 
Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum and 
then Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center. 
He asks, “NASA’s Faster, Better, Cheaper: Useful 
New Paradigm or Path to Disaster?” Either way, it is 
risky. 
The Mars Global Surveyor, with the Mars 
Pathfinder, was Lockheed Martin’s first FBC pro- 
ject. Pressure to perform is great, and a 5% cost 
overrun triggers a review or possible cancellation. 
Reviews, inspections and redundancies have to be 
reduced, but if performance proves good, the com- 
pany has a good chance for FBC missions in 2001, 
2003 and 2005. 
Hinners contrasted the program manager’s environ- 
ment in the past and now. In the past, cost overruns 
were forgiven if there was mission success, but today 
cost is an independent variable. In the past, failures 
were an integral part of experience, but now failure 
is increasingly unacceptable and/or “unavailable,” 
out of the question. In the past, the program manag- 
er exercised significant authority, but today that 
authority is constrained by bureaucracy and leader- 
ship of the Integrated Product Development team. In 
the past, program managers developed systems expe- 
rience through career development opportunities, but 
today many engineers are pigeonholed with little or 
no flexibility. In the past, program managers had 
greater trade space for redundancy as well as cost, 
mass, technology and schedule. Today, however, the 
PM is boxed in on all sides with cost, mass, LV and 
schedule. Finally, now a project is based on perfor- 
mance based contracting while in the past it was 
requirements driven. “Its a tougher job now,” 
Hinners noted. 
On the positive side, FBC is the “path to success.’’ It 
is THE way of life for NASA and thus Flight 
Systems, the FBC leader at Lockheed Martin 
Astronautics. Their Product Development 
Organization was set up for FBC; however, this does 
not always make things go easy. FBC challenges the 
way they do business, in which design-to-cost is a 
must. Teamwork and risk management are para- 
mount, but an unexcelled workforce is the key to 
making it work. “Mantra aside,” he notes, “mission 
success is still what counts.” 
On the negative side, FBC can potentially lead to sci- 
ence that is uninspiring or trivial, in which case both 
scientists and the public may lose interest. The high- 
er risks path can result in “too many” failures, but no 
one seems to know how many is too many, and there 
is still a low political tolerance for any failure. The 
new starts “numbers game” may get us one or two 
missions a year regardless of size. A poor technolo- 
gy plan could lead to the wrong technology invest- 
ment plan, wrong choices and few applications. 
Finally, FBC can burn out our engineers with pres- 
sure to succeed and excessive overtime. Some engi- 
neers, for example, routinely spent 70 to 80 hours a 
week on Clementine and Pathfinder. 
Hinners identified four required engineering skills 
that need to be emphasized by today’s engineers: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Teamwork. “The Lone Ranger is dead,” he notes, 
but “Integrated Product Teams are alive.” 
Communication. All engineers need to know 
how to write and speak clearly and accurately. 
Business. “As a NASA engineer I couldn’t care 
less if a TRW made a respectable profit or not,” 
he admits, but in industry you must focus on 
ROI, ROE, profit, loss and debt ratio. Also, the 
global economy suggests more international 
cooperation and collaboration. 
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4. Intuition. Besides being a world expert and hav- 
ing a “systems sense,” engineers need “brown 
envelope talents.” Continuing education and PO. Box I79 MS S8001 
consulting with experts are increasingly impor- 
DI: Noel Hinners 
Lockheed Martin Astronautics 
Denver; CO 80201 
noel. w. hinners @den.mmc.com 
tant for mission success. (303) 971-1581 
“We build trust by taking responsibility,” Hinners 
said, “and with mission success.” 
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Resources 
Heather Crump 
This bibliography was compiled by Heather Crump, 
Reference Librarian at NASA Headquarters Library. 
The following print resources are located in the 
NASA Headquarters Library ProgramIProject 
Management and Main Circulating collections. The 
electronic resources are available on the World Wide 
Web and are accessible to everyone. The designation 
before the call number indicates the collection. All 
items are available to NASA employees at all NASA 
installations. For more information, call the library at 
(202) 358-0172. 
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York, 1997. 
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http://www.exit 109.com/-leebee/ 
Randall 4 Practical Resources IS0  9000 
Executive Overview. 
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Full Cost Accounting 
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